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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis attempts a multi-dimensional epist-
emology for our fast-changing scientific age, which
is in an apparent need for an 'empirically adequate'
understanding of complexed events. Causal sequence,
linearity, and the classical Cartesian separation
between mind and matter have already become obsolete;
and replaced by (1) Acausation -- or events in the
world not usually causally related; (2) Nonlinearity
-- or events that are multi-dimensional and/or non-
sequential or disconnected; and (3) Consciousness --
or events having some apparent 'knowledge'" contained
within itself -- which can be considered rational,
irrational or both. Physical and social scientists,
whose innovations will be documented, have been
utilizing acausation, nonlinearity and consciousness
for several decades.
Several contemporary philosophers are selected
to demonstrate that there a critical need for a
new epistemology -- to 'bridge the gap' between the
notion of truth and the theory of meaning. By com-
bining the innovations of our physical and social
scientists along with the theories of our contemp-
orary philosophers, I hope to at least show a credible
possibility for 'bridging the wider gap'between the
physical and the social sciences.
FORWARD
"A Radical Epistemology of 'Other Worlds'" involves
1
2thsmes j (1) Acausation, (2) Nonlinearity
and (3) Consciousness. The atributes of each will
be demonstrated within four sections.
SECTION I. The 'Other Worlds' Of The
Physical Sciences.
SECTION II. The Merger of Mechanical &
Consciousness Systems Into The Acausal
Behavior Of 'Other Worlds.'
SECTION III. The Social Sciences And Its
'Other Worlds .
'
SECTION IV. The 'Other Worlds' Of Contemporary
Philosophy
.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
All the following terms, though general in
scope, will be further clarified in detail, and
in all their relationships and variations where
used in each section.
Acausation -- involves events occuring without cause.
Causa Sui -- are causes of itself which do not owe
its being to something else.
Complex Events -- are more than one event that
usually demonstrate a relationship toward each
other
.
Collective Need -- relates to mental or physical
events that depend upon each other for completion.
Consciousness involves events having some apparent
knowledge' contained within itself — which can be
considered rational, irrational or both.
Discontinuity -- involves events that demonstrate
isolation and not connected to other events.
Exponen tiali ty -- involves the doubling of units by
splitting in halves.
Historicism - - involves the deterministic role that
environment past and present plays upon mental
and physical events.
Indeterminancy -- is the lack of certainty for arriving
at conclusions which usually require some correlation
translation and conditional points of view rather
than absolute truths.
Infinity -- whether physical or mental, demonstrates
unlimited capacities within unlimited dimensions.
Noncontinual -- are isolated qualifications.
Nonlinearit y -- involves events that are multi-
dimensional and/or nonsequential or disconnected.
Nonsequential -- are disconnected events that are
unrelated, non-enumerative
,
and not continuous.
Ordered Connectedness -- involve sets that have a
consecutive relation within a determined system.
Other Worlds -- generic term for events or things
of other dimensions, other times, other
places, other values or other systems.
Points Of View -- assume uncertainty and attempts
empirical adequacy with satisfactory probabilities
Reverse Historiclsin -- is the ability of a single unit to
affect time, determinancy and events.
Simultaneity -- is the ability of events to occur at
an apparent same time. Since certainty is usually
not acceptable (within this paper's scope),
'same time' has a relevance 'to all practical
purposes' only.
Consequently, whenever the three major themes are
used: (1) Acausation (2) Nonlinearity and (3) Con-
sciousness, most of the defined attributes will
qualify each theme.
Generally, the qualifying attributes will be
found under these three major themes:
ACAUSATION NONLINEARITY
/
• Causa Sui • Complex Events
• Simultaneity • Noncontinual
• Nonlocality • Other Worlds
• Indeterminate
• Non-Sequential
• Infinity
• Exponentiality
• Ordered Connectedne
• Collective Need
• Discontinuity
• Historicism
• Reverse Historicism
• Points of View
CHAPTER II
THE 'OTHER WORLDS' OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION #1 : Simultaneity
As recently as April 1984, an article appeared
about robotics, describing the last but greatest
difficulty for a computer to perform like the human
brain: to solve problems s imultaneous ly rather than
consecutively. David McDonald, a professor of computer
information science, stated that:
<The computer scientists '> goal is to create a
machine that can obey written or spoken commands
in several languages, reason logically, write
computer programs without human supervision and,
most importantly, solve hundreds of inter-
connected problems sumultaneously rather than
consecutiydy . 1
Called 'parallel processing,' the new technique will
enable machines to perform many computations at once,
much as the human brain does.
SEQUENTIALLY ARRANGED BUT NONLINEAR IN ACTION —
'ONION SKIN' PARALLEL PROCESSING
Brain patterns overlap like an onion skin, with
each neural pattern arranged for parallel pro-
cessing. Although information in each neural
pattern, like a computer bank, is stored sequen-
tially, a few (or many) neural patterns in
parallel will 'fire simultaneously to obtain an
^idea' or command for action .
ACAUSAL: when
simul taneoi
5
6Up until now, epistemologies of both the physical
and social sciences have traditionally espoused a
linear methodology, based upon a consecutive series
of events. Computer Science has already presented us with
a radical epistemology for empirically demonstrating
that mental activities consist of:
1. Complexed events 5. Infinite capability
2. Nonlinear methodology 6. Consciousness
3. Acausal activity (a) Ordered connectedness
4. Other worlds (b) Collective need
SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION #2: Contains evidence of
(1) Physical 'other worlds' in the same universe
(2) Opposite points of view can be equally
correct
Cambridge Astronomer Stephen W. Hawking has revealed
that in the regime (or 'world') of relativity, black
holes expand. In the regime of quantum theory, black holes
shrink. Both theories are correct
,
depending on which
point of view taken.
According to Hawking, the black hole attracts matter
within a galaxy and grows in mass and size. In the heart
of a black hole lies something known as a "singular ity"--
a point at a theoretical edge of space and time that
may be infinitely small. Toward that edge, all the
matter of a star or even a universe races at unimaginable
7speed -- to be crushed into a region of infinite
density from which nothing escapes and where none of
the known laws of causality apply. In that vicinity
of a black hole, there is no way to predict either
the position or the speed of matter emitted by a black
hole. Toward the 'singularity,' one can only predict
the probabilities that certain matter will emerge in
another time or place in this universe. If matter is
spilled out to the other side, or the whi te hole, the
matter will enter another universe.
Stephen Hawking developed (above) the two
important, though apparently contradictory ways of
looking at black holes.
As illustrated, in the regime (or 'other world')
of Quantum theory, matter entering the black hole of
the Old Universe will shrink -- to re-emerge in another
time or place. In the regime of relativity or gravity
theory, when matter is perceived in the black hole.
8matter appears to expand toward a New Universe --
termed a 'white hole'.
According to Hawking, contradictory results only
reflect two different points of view -- which depend
on particular value systems of the observer -- yet, both
2
views are correct.
Hawking's important physical discovery adds
similar scientific evidence that reinforces Niels
Bohr's Unitive Principle of Complementarity ; that
contradictory or mutually exclusive domains or points
of view can provide an empirically adequate account.
Specifically, Bohr found that electrons sometimes
behaved as though they were particles and other times
behaved as though they were waves. The two possibilities,
wave or particle, appeared mutually exclusive; yet both
were needed to provide a comprehensive account at the
subatomic level.
In analogy, on a macrocosmic level, Hawking's
Black Hole/White Hole's mutually exclusive domains
domonstrate a similar epistemological approach: that
complexed events from different points of view can
be found correlational and complementary -- hence
both domains, 'worlds' or points of view can be correct.
SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION #3 : Biological Doubling
THE EXPONENTIAL VON NEUMANN MACHINE
-- First it doubles sequentially, but then
like the parallel processing in the brain,
it occurs simultaneously.
The most advanced theory of exponential growth, and
by far the most bizarre, is biological doubling by the Von
9Neumann Machine. The biological doubling of the amoeba
doubles itself by splitting naturally. The Von Neumann
Maching hopes to accomplish the same biological
doubling artificially by an actual machine repro-
ducing itself (doubling) from the raw materials
around it.
Arthur C. Clark, considered the 'Dean' of science
fiction writers, 'brought to light' the actual attempt
of achieving this effect by the U.S. Space Agency. In his
latest novel, 2010
,
the monolith (used in his previous
novel 2001 ) goes through exponential growth. The mono-
lith is found alongside the planet, Jupiter. Within a
very short time, by absorbing the materials of Jupiter,
the monolith doubled itself to cover the size of Jupiter
and simultaneousl y vanished -- along with Jupiter.
In Clark's final statement, in his novel 2010
,
he remarks that:
the Space Agency's been toying with the idea for
years -- exponentiating machines ... a bacteriophage.
The monolith reproduces every 2 hours, but after
eighty hours, a million-million. 3
Shades of bacteria warfare to an almost simultaneous
event -- (simultaneous for all practical purposes).
EXPONENTIAL
^
BACTERIOPHAGE
10
A NEW NOTION OF CAUSALITY
The fundamental role of nonlocal connections and
of probability in atomic physics requires a new notion
of causality. Classical science was constructed by the
Cartesian method of analyzing the world into parts and
arranging those parts according to causal laws. The
resulting deterministic picture of the universe was
closely related to the image of nature as a clockwork.
In atomic physics, such a mechanical and deterministic
picture is no longer possible. ^
In Quantum Theory, individual events do not always
have a well-defined cause. For example, the jump of an
electron from one atomic orbit to another, or the dis-
integration of a subatomic particle, may occur spon-
taneous ly without any single event causing it. We can
only predict its probability. This does not mean that
atomic events occur in completely arbitrary fashion; it
means only that they are not brought about by local causes .
The behavior of any part is definitely affected by its
nonlocal connections to the whole. ^
The concepts of nonlocality and statistical caus-
ality imply quite clearly that the structure of matter
and the structure of mind show that human consciousness
plays a crucial role in the process of observation. From
demonstrations, the observer is not only necessary to
observe the properties of an atomic phenomenon, but he
or she is necessary to bring about these properties. My
conscious decision how to observe an electron will
determine the electron's properties to some extent, as
exemplified by Bell's Theorem on page 24, and the
Quantum Theory Copenhagen Interpretation on page 36.
11
POINT OF VIEW AND CONSCIOUSNESS
When Niels Bohr investigated electrons, if he
looked for particles, the electrons behaved like
particles. When he looked for waves, the electrons
behaved like waves. What Bohr discovered was that electrons
have objective properties that are not necessarily
independent of the observer's mind. Consequently, in
atomic physics, the sharp Cartesian division between
mind and matter, between the observer and the observed,
can no longer be maintained. We, therefore, can never
speak about nature without simultaneously speaking
about ourselves. Thus, the scientific results obtained
will be conditioned by our point of view.
SYNCHRONICITY: ACAUSAL ORDEREDNESS
-- A distinction between causal (local) and acausal
(nonlocal)
Carl Jung postulated that psychological patterns
were connected not only causally but also acausally. In
particular, he introduced the terms "synchronicity" for
acausal connections between symbolic images in the inner
psychic 'world' and events in the external 'world.' Jung
saw these synchronistic connections as specific examples
of a more general "acausal orderedness" in mind and
matter. Today, this view seems supported by several
developments in physics. The notion of order, or more
12
precisely, of ordered connectedness
, are now also making
a distinction between causal (or local) and acausal
(or nonlocal) connections.
Consequently, observations of physical matter and
observations of mind demonstrate a correlation, as
exemplified by Niels Bohr's observations of the
electron
.
Following, in the explanations of brain/mind systems
and the merger of mechanical & consciousness systems
into acausal behavior, a notion of order, specifically
of ordered connectedness will be demonstrated more
fully
.
NONLINEAR 'WORLDS' OF CAUSALITY
Within the brain/mind sys tern , sequential events at
one level cause sequential events at other levels to
fire simultaneously, which result in acausal events.
To deal with the complexities of the brain/mind
system, we have to be able to slip between levels of
nonlinearity. Moreover, we will have to admit various
types of 'causality': ways in which an event at one
linear level of description can 'cause' events at other
levels to happen.
13
ACAUSAL: when 'fires'
simultaneously
1Sometimes a sequential event A will be said to
'cause' event B simply for the reason that the one is
a translation of another level . Sometimes three or
more will 'fire' simultaneously -- which is nonsequential
8for all practical purposes.
Both types: sequential causality and acausality --
and perhaps some more -- will have to be admitted in
any explanation of mind, for we will have to admit 'causes'
that propagate both upwards and downwards (nonlinear)
gin the 'Tangled Hierarchy Of Mentality.'
VARIOUS CAUSAL AND ACAUSAL POTENCIES
Like Hofstadter, the neuroscientist, Roger
Sperry, in his article, "Mind, Brain and Humanist Values
states that there exists within the brain many worlds of
diverse causal and acausal forces. Within each world are
forces within forces "as in no other cubic half-foot of
univers6that we know." In the nonlinear brain model pro-
posed here, the causal potency of an idea or an ideal
becomes just as real as that of a cell or a nerve impulse.
Ideas cause ideas and help evolve new ideas. They inter-
act with each other and with other mental forces in
the same brain, in neighboring brains, and thanks to
14
global communication, in far distant foreign brains.
Hence, they also can interact with external conscious-
ness acausally, to affect 'other worlds' as well.
PROBABILITY AND 'CONSCIOUSNESS'
In more formal terms, a complex system can only
be described by using a probability distribution that
relates the possible outcomes of an experiment. In
order to decide among the various alternatives, a
measurement is required. This measurement describes
the event, as distinguished from the probability, which
is a mathematical abstraction. However, the only simple
and consistent description physicists were able to assign
to a measurement involved an observer's becoming aware
of the result. Thus the physical event and the content
of the human mind were inseparable . This nonsequential
linkage forced many researchers to seriously consider
consciousness as an integral part of the structure of
physics. This led to the nonlinear content of conscious-
ness as an ultimate reality. We have thus, in linear steps,
gone around an epistemological circle -- from the mind
11back to the mind.
DISCONTINUITY AND 'CAUSA SUI'
IN EVOLUTION
In the next few pages, Stephen Gould's article about
15
’Punctuated Equilibrium' demonstrates dramatic instances
discontinuity in evolution, and a causa sui origin
of the universe itself. The "big bang," is a cosmic
example of a discontinuity. The beginning of life,
while less cataclysmic, is certainly another example.
The origin of life does not deny the underlying laws
of physics, but it adds a new feature: large scale
nonlinear molecular events. This rule change makes
evolutionary history indeterminate and thereby con-
stitutes a clear-cut discontinuity of 'other worlds.'
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER II:
THE 'OTHER WORLDS' OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES
The fundamental role of nonlocal connections, or
of relations and extensions to 'other worlds,' and of
the probabilities in the physical and social sciences,
now require a new notion of causality. The concepts of
non-locality (nonlinearity) and acausation imply quite
clearly that the structure of matter is not mechanical
-- in the Cartesian sense. The apparent similarities
between the structure of matter and the structure of
mind show that human consciousness plays a crucial
role in the process of observation -- even in the
physical 'world .
'
Hopefully, Section I demonstrated at least these
three innovations:
1 , Innovation of Simultaneity . The human brain
solves problems simultaneously even though each pattern
is arranged sequentially. A physical potential for
simultaneity exists by biological doubling, and
within the 'other worlds' of acausal orderedness.
2 . Innovation of Finding Physical 'Other Worlds. "
Hawking's Black Hole/White Hole discovery of
'other worlds' in the same universe adds physical
evidence of nonlinearity.
3. Opposite Points Of View can be equally correct,
as demonstrated by Stephen Hawking and Niels Bohr.
CHAPTER III
THE MERGER OF MECHANICAL & CONSCIOUSNESS
SYSTEMS INTO ACAUSAL BEHAVIOR
Paul E. Rapp of the Medical College of Pennsylvania
observes that computer-based electronic control systems
are becoming "more biological." Rapp’s concern is that
complex electronic networks "may display a failure mode
analagous to a convulsion." Already there is evidence
that computer systems have acted with an apparent con-
sciousness and have suffered mysterious breakdowns during
12military exercises and even in aircraft control systems.
This combining of computer networks and physiological
systems is an emerging field of' mathematics called 'topo-
logical dynamics,' which describes the way in which systems
change with time. This mathematical approach suggests that
systems governed by physical laws can undergo transitions
to a highly irregular form of consciousness.
David Ruelle of the Institut des Hautes Etudes Scienti-
fiques in France suggest that systems showing "chaotic"
behavior are frequently encountered in physics, chemistry
and biology.
17
One example, shown on the previous page, is the
illustrated, three-dimensional "Phase portrait" of a
chaotic state for an oscillating chemical reaction, in
which the concentrations of components can fluctuate
wildly over time. Analysis of the geometrical form
reveals whether the system is still governed by deter-
ministic equations like in (A), or behaving randomly
(noisy) like in (B) . The graph's trajectories demon-
strate an indeterminate, conscious behavior termed
13
"chaotic" in a mathematical sense.
Often, the relationship expressed in the equations
is nonlinear; that is, input and output are not pro-
portional. Mathematicians have learned that under the
right conditions, even simple sets of nonlinear dif-
ferential equations can yield numbers that appear as
a non-sequential pattern.
EVOLUTION'S 'PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM*
contain the attributes: Points of View,
Causa Sui, Indeterminancy, Noncontinual
,
Simultaniety
,
and Nonsequential.
To Stephen Jay Gould, the 'origin of species in
their life-and-death struggle takes on less significance,
because it produces very little evolutionary change.
Instead, by mechanisms not yet understood, new species
appear to split off at random from existing ones. This
'splitting off was not by gradual growth from one
generation to the next but discontinuously called
19
"punctuated equilibrium." Evolutionary biology is a
synthesis of paleontology, population genetics and
comparative anatomy, each with its own point of view.
"Punctuated Equilibrium" suggests that the equli-
brium of life is 'punctuated' from time to time by
severe stress. If a small segment of the ancestral
population is isolated at the periphery of its accustomed
range, it may give way to a new species. Also, the pop-
ulation is stressed intensely because it is living at
the edge of its tolerance. "Favorable variations spread
quickly," Stephen Gould said. "Small peripheral isolates
are the laboratory of evolutionary change."
The old paradigm saw evolution as a steady climb
up a ladder, whereas Gould and others liken it to a
branching out of various limbs of a tree. For instance,
anthropologists have discovered in recent years that at
one time (non-sequentially ) there were at least three
coexisting hominids -- creatures that had evolved beyond
the ape. Earlier it was believed that these different
specimens formed a sequence. Several different lineages
split from the parent stock, the lower primates. Some
20
survived and continued to evolve, while others dis-
appeared. The large-brained Homo appeared quite suddenly.
PLURALISTIC POINTS OF VIEW
(1) Communal Consciousness
(2) Collective Need
We need pluralistic philosophers that free us to see
evidence from many points of view. Colin Wilson suggested
that there is not only Communal Consciousness among a
genus but that its very existence is due to a telepathic
genetic connection. The genus-community is, in a sense,
a single individual or a single mind whose genes were
influenced by the collective mind.
CONSCIOUSNESS; MIND THINKING ITSELF
(CAUSA SUI)
Aristotle was the first to analyze consciousness as
a form of acausation -- in that of 'mind thinking itself,'
where subject and object are non-sequential but identical.
Even though categorized into form and matter or into
potentiality and actuality, they are inseparable, and
for all practical purposes operate simultaneously and
acausally
.
To Aristotle, this 'divine-like' attribute of mind
was termed Nous , which denoted the faculty of apprehending
the first principle of science, the forms and eternal
21
intelligible substances, and is thus distinguished
from discursive thought. Aristotle distinguished be-
tween the nous pathetikos
. or passive reason, and a
higher active reason, called by the commentators nous
poiet ikos
,
which alone is 'truly divine and eternal,'
and which is related to the nous pathetikos as form toIQ
matter
.
This relationship between potentiality and actuality,
in relation to form and matter, Aristotle applied to
his theory of mind thinking itself. Here, like form to
matter, the subject of thought is likewise not separated
from its object.
De Anima 430^3-5;
Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as
its objects are. For (a) in the case of objects
which involve no matter, what thinks and what is
thought are identical; for speculative knowledge
and its object are identical.
De Anima 300^15-25 ;
Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in
the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior
to actual knowledge, but in the universe as a whole
it is not prior even in time.
' MIND THINKING ITSELF' IS ANALAGOUS
TO THE 'CONSCIOUSNESS' OF BELL'S THEOREM
Bell's Theorem , f irs t proposed in 1964 by the
physicist John S. Bell, was first confirmed by experi-
ment in 1972 by Professor John Clauser at Berkley:
If the statistical predictions of quantum theory
are true, an objective universe is incompatible
with the law of local causes. 19
The above statement simply states that an 'objective
22
universe does not exist apart from our consciousness
.
and that instantaneous change in widely separated
systems did occur. In 1972, Clauser confirmed the
statistical predictions working with an elaborate
system involving photons, calcite crystals, and photo
90 ^ r
multiplier tubes.
In consequence, two particles, once in contact,
separated even to the ends of the universe, changed
instantaneously when a change in one of them occurs. In
some unexplainable way, the separated particles are still
in contact although separated in space. The only possible
explanation is that particles also have some form of
'consciousness' or information.
When we fire a photon through a single open slit,
as in (B), the photon is registered straight on the
photographic plate. But, when we fire a photon as in (C)
in the same straight manner against a double opening, the
particle will change its course, find the opening and
register straight through the opening as seen on (C)--
or, the photon will sometimes split into two particles,
sometimes register as two particles, or sometimes register
23
as one photon as seen on (A).
The question raised was, "How did the photon 'know' to
change its natural course?" Some physicists, like E.H.
Walker, speculate that photons, which are energy, do
appear to process information and act accordingly.
MATHEMATICAL NONLINEARTY
Douglas Hofstadter's 1980 Pulitzer Prize-winning
book, Gddel, Escher, Bach
,
radicalized logic. From
certainty, consistency and linear levels of computation,
logic is now, and should be observed from, a hermeneutical
point of view which encompasses undefined multilevels , in-
cons is tencies and many infinities.
Hofstadter begins with Kurt Gddel' s Incompleteness
Theorem: "All consistent axiomatic formulations of number
22
theory include undecidable propositions."
Then, Hofstadter stressed a need for interpretations
to regain any logical consistency, by clarifying the
necessity of different points of view for computation.
By changing interpretations we regained a consistency
It now becomes clear that consistency is not a pro-
perty of a formal system per se, but depends on the
interpretation proposed for it. By the same token,
inconsistency is not an intrinsic property of any
formal system. 23
The certainty of predictability is replaced from tradition
al particularities to relations of multi-levels, or non-
linearity, which Hofstadter terms recursion -- which is a
domain where ' sameness-in-dif f erentness plays a central
role. Recursion is based on the same thing happening on
several different levels at once. But the events on
24
different levels are not exactly the same.
Hofstadter correlates language-usage with computer
systems, and demonstrates why traditional language usage
is archaic for comprehending recursion. What is confusing
(to Hofstadter) is when a single system admits of two or
more descriptions on different levels which resemble each
other in some way.
Apparently, our confusion about who we are is certainly
related to the fact that we consist of a large set of levels
-- yet a computer program can be viewed on a number of
levels, which makes all the descriptions similar in
some ways to each other -- yet there are extremely import-
25ant differences on different levels.
Hofstadter also blames our traditional logic for its
'either-or' linear approach based on singular entities,
where entities are categorized and separated into holistic
or reductionist opposites. The author-mathematician
interestingly answers the problem by a combination quantum
and Zen Buddhist analogy -- by ’’unasking the question” --
similar to Hans Gadamer’s ’unasking deception.”
To ’’unask” singular entities, is to reject singular
certainties toward a notion of complementarity.
Analogically, the Zen answer rejects the premisses
of the question which are that one or the other must be
chosen. By unasking the question, it reveals a wider truth
that there is a larger context into which both holistic
2 6
and reductionist explanations fit.
ANALOGICAL NONLINEARITY
Hofstadter correlates mathematical infinities with
the physical nonlinearity of brain functions. He first
compares the nonlinear functions of the brain to the
linear functions of the computer.
25
SYMBOLS
—SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE?
With the enormous ever-growing repertoire of
symbols that exist in each brain, you might wonder
whether there eventually comes a point when the brain
is saturated ... in fact, overlapping and completely
tangled symbols are probably the rule, so that each
neuron is probably a functioning part of hundreds
of symbols. 27
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER III;
THE MERGER OF MECHANICAL AND CONSCIOUSNESS
SYSTEMS INTO ACAUSAL BEHAVIOR
This section included the attributes of Consciousness,
Nonlinearty, Nonsequentiality, Collective Need and Indeter-
minancy. In summation, the chapter states the following
highlights
:
1. Computer-based electronic control systems are be-
coming more biological and evidence an apparent con-
sciousness.
2. This merger of computer networks and physiological
systems are analyzed by a mathematics called 'topo-
logical dynamics.'
3. Mechainical systems showing "chaotic" behavior are
encountered in physics, chemistry and biology.
26
4. Evolutionay biology, by mechanisms not yet
understood, are 'splitting off -- away from
gradual growth toward a 'punctuated equilibrium'
-- from severe stress.
5. There is found among genera a communal conscious-
ness or collective mind.
6. The mind is capable of thinking itself (causa
sui )
.
7. An objective universe does not exist apart from
our consciousness -- allowing for instantaneous change
in widely separated systems.
8. Particles show some form of consciousness.
9. Computations now also require different points of
view
.
CHAPTER IV
In the diagram (Fig. A), neurons are laid out as
dots (solid or outline), in one plane, or level. Two
overlapping neural pathways are shown. It may happen
that two independent neural flashes simultaneously race
down these two pathways, passing through one another like
two ripples on a pond's surface. The overlapping and re-
sulting new symbols are shown as shaded dots.
Potentially, there are not only an infinite number
of pathways in a brain, but also an infinite number of
symbols. New concepts can be formed from old ones. Demon-
strated in Fig. A is a single level of brain function in
the conscious part of the brain -- traditionally con-
sidered linear, finite entities of brain patterns. These
linear brain patterns, considered formed from childhood
and continually stored in memory banks, have usually been
considered limited according to aptitude. Hofstadter shows,
that analogical credibility, even in the smallest level
of consciousness, can be realized by the overlapping of
logical patterns to form incredible unlimited new symbols.
NONLINEAR BRAIN FUNCTIONS
Computer art has demonstrated infinite variations from a
27
28
single, linear drawing. Human variations in games and
music are situated in the linear levels of conscious-
ness (like onion skins). What if nonlinear combinations
are utilized between the levels of consciousness and
multilevels of the unconscious?
Another nonlinear dimension of infinite variations
are surfaced and demonstrated by the illustration shown
(Fig.B), where nonlinear, infinite overlapping is obtained
on many Jungian levels as well.
PSYCHOANALYTICAL NONLINEARITY
(1) The psychoanalytical views of Carl Jung demon-
strate a closer affinity to Hans Gadamer's ideas rather
than to Freud's; specifically, Jung agrees about the
nonlinearity of the unconscious which correlates to
Gadamer's his toricism and infinite consciousness.
(2) Reverse historicism is evidenced by Random
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Experimentation where the observer reverses the causality
of the observed.
Carl C. Jung separates the unconscious levels from the
conscious by showing the unconscious levels as nonlinear
and infinite in scope, whereas the conscious levels are
linear and limited.
The area of the unconscious is enormous and always
continuous <infinite>, while the area of conscious-
ness is a restricted field of momentary vision. 28
ECTOPSYCHIC
SPHERE
PERSONAL
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CARL JUNG'S UNCONSCIOUS PROCESS
Jung's major contribution is considered within his
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analysis of the two classes of the unconscious process:
-- the subconscious or Personal Unconscious, and the
Collective Unconscious.
The Subconscious or Personal Unconscious contains
recognizable material of personal origin, instinct and
personality. Included are the forgotten or repressed con-
tents as well as creative contents.
The Collective Unconscious is of unknown origin and
mythological in character as if it belongs not to any
particular mind or person, but rather to humanity in
general. The collective patterns are termed archetypes
which mean a typos <imprint>, a grouping of archaic
mythological motifs, e.g. the figures of the messianic
hero, the redeemer, the dragon (who the hero has to over-
come) and the whale or monster who swallows the hero.
Jung hints of nonlinearity, indeterminancy and infinity
when he mentions that:
our personal unconscious, as well as the collective
unconscious, consists of an indefinite number of
complexes or fragmentary personalities. 29
JUNG'S PARALLEL TO HERMENEUTICAL HISTORICISM
-- Events of Causi Sui and Simultaneity
The Archetypal contents, in the form of images, can
be understood by comparing them to historical parallels.
If not recognized as historical, they are not integrated
into consciousness and they remain projected. The arche
types are not subject to any arbitrary intention or are
controllable by the will (indeterminate). They actually
behave 'non-local' as if they did not exist in yourself.
Perhaps one of the first accounts of German
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hermeneutical historicism is recorded by Jung in 1930
during one of his many visits to colleagues in Germany.
Would you believe that a whole nation of highly in-
telligent and cultivated people could be seized by
the fascinating power of an archetype? . . . one cannot
resist it ... it is a power that fascinates people
from within
. . . because it is an archetype ... an
incomprehensible fate has seized them ... it has
nothing to do with rational judgment, it is just
history ... whether you assume that the Nazi storm in
Germany has a religious value or not does not matter.
It has. Fascism is the Latin form of religion, and
its religious character explains why the whole thing
has such a tremendous fascination.. 31
A contemporary example of American historicism at work
(to show that it could and did happen here) are the gang
rapes in the U.S., where hypnotic peer pressure and 'an
ancient reflex' incited a simultaneous event causa sui .
The psychologist, Roger Rosenblatt, explains an
analogy to Jung's collective unconscious:
It is that moment of seemingly hypnotized attention
that most men know and dread. It is a moment in which
they are out of control as individuals -- not merely
outside the law, but out of biological order. Something
stirs, an ancient reflex, as if they are dragged back
through history to a starting point in evolution. 32
THE 'OTHER WORLD' OF HISTORICITY
In fact, history does not belong to
us, but we belong to it.
-- Hans Gadamer
Cicero called historicity the vita memoriae which
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meant a totally different source of truth from theoretical
reason. It exists in its own right because human passions
cannot be governed by the universal prescriptions of reason."
Bacon added the level-concept by describing historicity as
"another way of philosophising."
All are attributes of historicity. Theoretical reason-
ing, ideal and universal, is a level of nonlinear infinity.
A "different source of truth," means only that it is
another universal. "It exists in its own right" and qualifies
it to its own nonlinear level, or universal being. Basically,
Historicity is the nonlinear, deterministic role that
history plays for the simple linear actions of humanity.
SENSUS COMMUNIS
Sensus Communis is one universal level within other
levels of historicity. It's the communal sense that de-
termines the quality of living. It's the concrete general-
ity that can represent a people, a nation or the whole
human race. It's the external ethical sense through living
in the community which is determined by its universal aims
through its linear circumstances.
ERLEBNIS
Er lebnis synthesizes the concept of life (leben), a
connection with totality, with infinity -- where every ac
as an element of life remains connected with the infinity
of life that manifests itself in it. Everything finite is
t
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an expression, a representation of the infinite.
Hans Gadamer, however, clarifies the infinite level
or role that Erlebnis plays through the persona of Bergson.
Bergson's duree emphasized the relations of continuity
,
rather than parts of a whole; i.e. duree synthesized these
relations, like "listening to the melody where all the
3 6
notes intermingle."
Consequently, "history does not belong to us, but we
belong to it." Hans Gadamer explicitly writes of the over-
whelming influence that history plays on every individual.
Free will and determination appear conveniently absent,
but when analyzed sequentially, the miniscule, finite individ-
ual will appear "imprisoned in the infinite layers of the
closed circuits of historical life." That is why the pre-
judices of the individual, far more that his judgments,
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constitute the historical reality of his being.
The story of Carl Jung's 1930 visit to Germany supports
the overwhelming determination that historicity plays on an
entire nation. Evidently influenced by Marx, Gadamer resolves
this determined domination -- not by economics or politics,
however, but by understanding -- cryptically fragmented by
Gadamer into a final fragment:
understanding ultimately finds its fulfillment only in
<another 'world' of> an infinite consciousness, which
is also the ground of the idea of individuality. 38
CONSCIOUSNESS: THE 'OTHER WORLD' OF
POTENTIAL REVERSE HISTORICISM
This is the crux of the Quantum Theory Copenhagen Inter-
pretation: that the observer affects the observed.
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His tor icism has shown by its ontological independent
existence to possess the quality of affecting particular
observers. Traditional cognition has ill-defined this
process as an ability of an observer to extract infor-
mation from its environment. But may the reverse also be
possible? May 'consciousness' have the ability to insert
information into its environment? i.e. may the particular
observer affect the observed or universal historicism?
The following experiment with random number generators
demonstrates that reverse historicism has been accomplished
under rigorous scientific control. The experiential method-
ology consisted of participants observing and ultimately
influencing sequences of random numbers solely by mental
means. The experiment involved three basic elements:
1. A source of "true" random numbers, typically based
on radioactive decay.
2. A statistical analysis technique.
3. An individual who attempts to cause, by means alone,
a change in the random source's output, to differ
39from chance expectation during designated periods.
The reason for this experimental methodology is to eliminate
any possible outside means of influence other than mental
influence. The only form of direct physical interraction is
shown when a participant presses a start button. All the
rest is controlled by computer. Specifically, the subject's
task is to cause mentally either an excess number of ones
or an excess number of zeroes in a random binary sequence.
(This is another related example within the binary infinities
already shown in math and physics).
Results of such experiments show that selected subjects
can statistically influence random sequence according to
predefined instructions. The odds of the observed distortions
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from pure chance have been calculated at greater than one
in a 100 million. Under controlled conditions where sub-
jects do not attempt to influence the random number
sequence, no deviation from chance is seen.
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER IV;
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Demonstrated were recent evidence to show that
similar to subatomic physics and astronomy, the human
brain is also found to be nonlinear, and contains the
potentiality of an infinite number of symbols.
Within Contemporary German philosophy, Gadamer's
His tor icism also demonstrates 'another world' of non-
linear, deterministic capability that history plays on
the mind.
However, an individual by 'consciousness' can
reverse the deterministic historicism by a new experimental
process with random number generators. Such experiments
demonstrate that selected subjects can statistically
influence random sequence according to predefined
ins tructions .
CHAPTER V
THE 'OTHER WORLDS'
OF PHILOSOPHY
A 'sampling' of contemporary philosophers are
selected to demonstrate the critical need for a new
epistemology -- to 'bridge' the admitted gap between
the notion of truth and the theory of meaning. I selected
as representatives:
Hilary Putnam
Bas C. Van Fraasen
Michael Dummett
Bruce Aune
35
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HILARY PUTNAM
• Nonlinearity
• Consciousness
• Causa Sui
Putnam excellently describes how the brain trans-
lates its nonlinear images. Similar to the computer, he
writes that the brain has digital aspects "but it may
well process a considerable amount of non-digital in-
formation" <nonlinearity > . In particular, translation
need not be 'mechanical' in all its aspects, that some-
times we match pictures to the situations we are in, in
order to find the 'frame' to use in translation, < causa
sui consciousness>
.
To Putnam, translation is a form of Vers tehen
,
in
that some of our ability to picture how people are likely
to respond may well be innate <like the collective un-
conscious>. Physics may also rest on Vers tehen as much
as the social sciences. The contention is that Vers tehen
belongs to the 'context of discovery' <within a causa sui
context> and not to the 'context' of justification.'
Consequently, Putnam feels that Verstehen is a source of
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prior probability which is ultimately intuitive.
Putnam feels that the social sciences do not have
a standard of objectivity like the physical sciences. He
is not saying that scientific method has no place in the
social sciences, it is just that it is a pluralistic
PUTNAM'S PLURALISM
Consisting of: Nonlinearity & Probability
problem '
:
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that all these have their place and we should use them
when and where we can. Should we regret the fact that
the social sciences cannot realistically hope to resemble
physical sciences?
But we have seen (in the previous essays) that in
the spectrums of subatomic physics and astronomy that
there are 'similar' consciousness, acausation and points—
of-view, and perhaps by probability statistics we can
describe social complexed systems as 'empirically adequate'
--especially, as shown above, Putnam admits that Ver s tehn
is a source of prior probability. Putnam explicitly mentions
that 'other worlds' and different points of view require
alternate epistemologies -- that what our 'methods are in
any domain <world> will depend on what our beliefs <points
of view> are concerning the subject matter of that domain
<world> and on beliefs in other domains <other worlds>.
From such a point of view, the problem of explaining the
reliability of learning is not a priori <or nonlinear,
non-sequential> but to show that we can understand that
reality is a fact of nature <which is also acausal and
T N ^2nonlinear>
.
Unfortunately, on the subject of meaning
,
Putnam
loses his concept of 'other domains' <other worlds>,
denying the inner world of consciousness. -- that mean-
ing is not just a function of what goes on 'in our heads,'
but also of reference, and reference is determined by
social practices and by actual physical paradigms, and
not just by which goes on inside any individual speaker.
Putnam is most likely denying any reality to 'the brain
in the vat'. My previous essays on consciousness d^ exhibit
the existence of many inner worlds of 'consciousness' and
would therefore also accept 'the brain in the vat' as
another world — though limited in scope.
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In his later work (1982), Putnam weakly implies the
existence of an inner world, (that particular 'conscious-
ness' which has attributes of causa sui and nonlinearty)
by "attempting to break the strangle hold of the dichotomy
between objective and subjective views of truth." But he
never reaches the point of combining subject/object.
Instead, he almost denies the external objective world
by favoring the "idealogical label." He states that
once such a dichotomy between 'objective' and 'subjective'
has been accepted as a characterization of types of views
and styles of thought, thinkers begin to view the terms of
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the dichotomy almost as idealogical labels.
Putnam's serious 'flaw', after regogizing the 'many
worlds,' disclaims the objective worlds in favor of the
subjective world -- yet, he previously denied that the
subjective world had many inner worlds of its own. Agreeing
with Kuhn, Feyerabend and Foucault, they agree that the
alternative to a r\aive copy conception of truth is to see
systems of thought, ideologies, scientific theories, as
subiective
.
Consequently, it seems that Putnam's subjective world
also remains in a linear domain. He strongly proclaims
that formal logic of a concept is not all there is to the
notion of truth, and therefore a correspondence account is
needed to understand how language and science works. But,
by denying the inner world of consciousness (though admitting
'verstehn'), such a 'correspondence account' cannot have
sufficient probability statistics to validate any simplistic
correspondence
.
However, through his vacillations, Hilary Putnam doe s
demonstrate the existence of 'inner worlds,' such as a 'con-
sciousness' which has attributes of causa sui and nonlinearity.
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and thereby comes close to combining the subject/object
'many worlds' after all.
Fraasen's constructive empiricism creditably attempts
to update philosophy with scientific method:
Science aims to give us. theories which are empirically
adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief
only that it is empirically adequate. 46
And to Fraasen's further credit, he demonstrates that
even the observable can be a vague predicate, such as when
the sun rising and setting is "guided by a picture now
explicitly disavowed." Hence, he agrees with Reichenbach '
s
principle of the common cause
,
that there are the existence
of unobservable events <such as 'other worlds>; the correct
way to view science is by seeking for 'common causes' of
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a probabilistic or statistical sort.
His excellent discussion of causation by Norwood Russell
Hanson involves an agreement of 'other worlds', many points
of view, and nonlinear complexed events; that there are
many causes <nonliner> of x as there are explanations <points
of view> of X, Consider how the cause of death might have
been set out by a physician as 'multiple haemorrhage,' by
the barrister as 'negligence on the part of the driver,
by a carriage-builder as 'a defect in the brake block con-
struction,' by a civic planner as 'the presence of tall
,
.
.
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shrubbery at that turning.
Even a 'simple-simple' linear event, where ^ is the
cause of B| Van Fraasen rightfully attaches the contextual
BAS C. VAN FRAASEN
• Other worlds
• Probability
• Empirically adequate
• Nonlinearity
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factor "in which the sentence is uttered*" consequently,
and properly, that linearity is also interrelated with
’outer worlds.' He mentions that the nature of A and ^
will in most cases also play a role, indirectly, but it
is in the first place the orientation or the chosen point
of view of the speaker that determines what the word
49
'cause is used to signify.
Fraasen marvelously recognizes most of the limitations
of 'linear-logic,' and refers to the* necessary 'omniscient'
ability to totally understand given facts, such as when
the description of some account as an explanation of a
given fact or event is incomplete. It can only be an ex-
planation with respect to a certain relevance relation and
and a certain contrast-class <of another 'world' > . An
omniscient Being would have a complete explanation, whereas
these contextual factors only bespeak our limitations.
But Fraasen, most correctly, does not believe in
certainties or 'complete explantions , ' and adequately is
updated to the epistemic commitment toward the weaker belief
that "it is empirically adequate."
FRAASEN 'S 'PROBABILITY'
--Empirical Adequacy
Fraasen competently examines 'many worlds' of pro-
bability solutions for empirical adequacy, based on David
Lewis' advanced view of laws of nature as factual statements
about "the real possible worlds (as opposed to the logical
conceivable but unreal worlds) of which ours, the actual
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one, is but an equal among equals'* <other worlds>.
Up until recently, even the ' advanced ' theoretical
physicists could only hope for approximation s . Fraasen
is most up-to-date in presenting the potentiality of
quantity concepts. Fraasen correctly states that we do not
have exact knowledge. We only know the values of the initial
quantities approximately, but 'approximate' is misleadingly
vague, and can only be replaced by a quantitative concept. ^
Within Van Fraasen's 'Epistemic Probability,' quantitative
concepts is the relation that it bears to a body of infor-
mation (that person's information) or of what would happen
if » Probability is not a property of an actual course of
events, but of the conditions in which these events occur
such as the experimental arrangement or chance set-up.
Karl Popper, in 1957, explicitly presented this as
a more sophisticated version of the frequency interpre-
tation, the difference lying in an appeal to what would
happen
,
if the conditions were realized sufficiently often.
Consequently, a probability space is a model of a
repeatable experiment or^ chance set-up. This significanc e
has immeasurably advanced the social sciences. How? Fraasen
has laid to rest the pessimistic viewpoint that "now that
certainty is dead (like Nietzsche's 'God') all that we
could hope for are vague approximations Quantitative
concepts within Fraasen's constructive empiricism fully
demonstrate pragmatic models for empirical adequacy.
MICHAEL DUMMETT
Dummett outlines most proficiently the 'many faces'
of realism, and summates with Wittgenstein (correctly), that
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all the same there does not yet exist proof* (of certainty).
Of course, as shown, if we combine the various points of view,
we'll at least get an 'empirically adequate' result, (i.e.,
certainty and Clark Gable is "Gone with the Wind.")
However, each face of Realism, like any linear event,
does contain linear substance that contains simple 'realities.'
I thoroughly believe in each reality, but prefer to keep
them in their simplistic linearity. In combination, we can
'move the many worlds.'
From Dummett, I extrapolate that Realis m is the belief
that statements of a linear class possess an objective truth-
value, independently of our means of knowing it. They are
true or false in virtue of a reality existing independently
of us. I believe it, and E.E. Moore's Common Sense states
it most aptly that when you see a moving car passing by, you
had better not step in front of it. That is external reality!
Antirealism takes the form of a species of reductionism
.
Thus phenomenalism holds that material-object statements are
reducible to ones about sense-data, and scientific positivism
holds that statements about electrons relate ultimately only
to pointer-readings; -- statements about character are
really about behavior.
To Radin, each is like a politician serving self-
interest instead of collectivel y gathering linear points
of view for a more ' adequate * representation of complex
events
.
For the platonist, the meaning of a mathematical
statement is to be explained in terms of its truth con-
ditions; for each statement there is something in math-
ematical reality in virtue of which it is either true or
false. For the constructivist, the general form of an ex-
planation of meaning must be in terms of the conditions
under which we regard ourselves as justified in asserting
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a statement, that is, the circumstances in which we are
in a possession of a proof.
Yet, in our innovative logician's way of summing up
their adequacies in toto, Wittgenstein states that "all
the same there does not yet exist a proof, since when we
discover the document it is still up to us to decide whether
or not we wish to count it as a proof.
Even with the usage that Wittgenstein recommended,
1 agree with Dummett that when pragmatically applied, the
terms lack certainty
,
and only refer to or is extended to
others as 'blind faith.'
DUMMETT 'S ARTICLE: "CAN AN EFFECT
PRECEDE ITS CAUSE? (1955)"
To myself, one of Dummett's most creative contributions
is his article, "Can An Effect Precede Its Cause?" To
Dummett, the thought that an effect might precede its
cause appears at first nonsensical. He hints of potential
'other worlds' by leading with "perhaps if the world were
different ..."
Of prime concern to any simple event is that there
always exists the possibility of an intermediary agent
within the simple event. Hence, even though that
whenever A happens, B follows
we can observe that an event is a sufficient condition for
an event of another kind to have taken place previously;
and why should we not then call the later event 'cause'
of the earlier?
One of Dummett's s tronges
t
arguments for this case is
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that (1) there can never be any certainty about the
simplest linear event, since during the interval some-
thing might always intervene to hinder the fulfillment
of the cause. The second strong point:
(2) is a 'necessary temporal' direction of causation,
5 Q ^from earlier to later.
To Radin, point (1) correctly states that even a
simple linear event has the potential of 'other worlds'
within the event and thereby contains no certainty. Point
(2) totally decimates his article as nonsense as long as
there exists a temporal direction; it would be 'naturally'
impossible to reverse time -- for all practical purposes.
However , though Dummett apparently did not intend the following
illustration (about the alarm clock) to show acausation or
causa su i) to me, the possible implication exists for an
action of causa sui . During such a nonlinear, non-sequential
occasion, an effect can precede its cause -- as demonstrated
in previous essays. Dummett 's own 'certainty' refutes his
previous conclusion of uncertainty, to the effect that any
causal change involves quasi-causal explanation; and there-
fore uncertain to attempt to do this would plainly be non-
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sensical that the past is fixed, and the future is fluid.
At least he should conclude with a 'potential' for
complex events. In any case, Dummett intuitivel y feels that
there are the other worlds (which successively demonstrate
timeless acausation) -- otherwise he would not have raised
the question, even in jest. In his next article, "The Reality
Of The Past',' you could just f eel , though intuitively,
Dummett 's pain in trying to solve the time problem. He
comments that we are immersed in time, and being so immersed,
we cannot frame any description of the world. The past
exists only in the traces it has left upon the present; and
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that the past exists as past as it is present.
In his later work, Realism
, Michael Dummett 'throws
in the towel' about the difficult temporal element of
causation. He admits of 'other worlds' but from a
Neutralist' (linear) viewpoint, can only cope with one
world at a time, such as he relates a semantic theory to
a world at a particular time. He gives up his previous
(correct) uncertainties and finds certainty within one
world, when he sides with the neutralist:
the central notion for a semantic theory is not that
of a statement's being true absolutely, but of its
being true in a 'world.' 62
And then, erroneously, Dummett attempts to 'continually'
eliminate the other worlds -- to correspond one world as
'common' to many worlds, when he states that the set of
possible 'worlds' continually diminshes with the passage
of time; that is to say, the various 'worlds' may be
regarded as forming paths in a mathematical tree, in the
nodes of the tree -- the points at which the paths diverge,
corresponding to a state of a 'world' at a particular time,
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each state being common to many 'worlds.'
Most contradictory! A mathematical tree is one
particular 'world' of abs traction . The 'inner worlds' of
the mind are 'other worlds.' The empirical 'outer worlds'
are still infinite 'other worlds.' Under no 'empirically
adequate' domain can we correspond to a state being common
to 'many worlds.' That statement reverts to Newtonian and
Cartesian linearity.
However, as Van Fraasen demonstrated, by definite
nonlinear quantitative concepts, pragmatic modals for
empirical adequacy can be successfully accomplished.
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BRUCE AUNE
Though published in 1977, Bruce Aune's book, Reason
And Action
,
best demonstrates causa sui and 'other worlds'
of the mind. Through "Prichard's Theory Of Voluntary
Activity," Aune clearly views the mental process as non-
linear complex events 'individuated' -- or separate from
cause and effect (which places 'action' as a causa sui
V 64
event )
,
Terming the action as the process or activity of
willing itself, Prichard argued that the activity cannot
be considered causing that result. Willing is one thing
and the result another. Both occur when an action is per-
formed -- similar to the nonlinear action of several levels
of consciousness as demonstrated in Figure 1.
12 .
As shown, though patterns A and A involve sequential
action, the s imultaneous action of 2 or more patterns are
acausal for all practical purposes.
Consequently, to Prichard, an action is an activity;
there is no activity of causing or originating something.
What activity then will cause his foot to move? Pritchard
says this is a kind of activity of whose nature we are
dimly aware (though it is explained above as acausal) but
he calls this activity "willing."
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THE ACCORDIAN EFFECT
-- of a complex activity
Austin also goes along with activity as the causa sui
and not as any "smaller or a larger stretch of events."
When Brutus stabbed Caesar, the death of Caesar was the
causa sui of his activity and not part of it.
TRADITIONALLY, ACTIVITY INDIVIDUATED
(OR CAUSA SUI) WAS CONSIDERED 'AGENT CAUSATION"
To Aune, philosophers traditionally would reject
Prichard's basic premiss about causation; particularly
that statements affirming that a thing or person caused
or brought about a result are reducible to statements of
the form
'(3A) (a is an activity by ^ and A caused E)
'
Thus, they would want to reject Prichard's view that so-
called agent causation is reducible to what we might call
'event causation." I agree with Aune that Prichard's view
is preferable when he states that if we say that John
moved his hand at time _t, we may indeed add -- that caused
his hand to move at that time. But that is not to say that
he was the irreducible cause of his hand's motion; if he
were then, since he existed yesterday, his hand should
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have moved the same way yesterday too.
Nothing further is said, but to clarify the fallacy of
any 'agent causation,' the action is a nonlinear or complex
event which 'fires' causa sui , and not 'accordian effect
which is sequential.
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PRICHARD'S INDIVIDUATED ACTION
a causa sui simultaneous action
A. COMPLEX SIMULTANEOUS ACTION
A. To Prichard, A is supposedly the irreducible cause of
then whenever we have A, we should have
^ as well.
Clearly if John did move his hand at a certain time, then
there must have been something about him. (perhaps a complex
simultaneous 'action' or firing of neurons) at that time
which accounts for occurence , then
,
of his hand's
movement.
B. MENTAL ACTIVITY (LIKE ' CONSIOUSNESS
'
)
B. When we think of a person's action, we do not think
of a mere response to some physiological change. We do
think of a person as a conscious agent, but we regard his
voluntary movements as somehow due to his mental activity
(which is 'consciousness' or sumultaneous activity).
C. WILLING
C. This kind of (causa sui) mental activity Prichard calls
I . 1 1 • I 66willing
.
Chisholm called this activity of moving one's arm
as a very complexed one, involving beliefs and pro-attitudes
-- a special activity of 'endeavoring' (which explains the
nonlinear attributes of complex activity).
Unfortunately, Prichard insisted that willing is
'a mental activity of whose nature we are dimly aware.'
On one hand he says in doing an action we become clearly
aware by reflecting on it, but finally decides that the
nature of 'willing' is sui generis and so incapable of
being defined.
50
To define' with certainty would be an incapability,
but as explained several times, with the new probability
methods, pragmatic modals for empirical adequacy would
give satisfactory or significant results. Davidson adds
further attributes to demonstrate the complexities of an
action, which consisted of
(a) a pro attitude towards actions with a certain
property
.
(b) a belief that the action in question under a
certain description has that property.
QUINE'S INDETERMINANCY
I agree with Quine, that all translation is relative,
or as he sometimes states, 'indeterminate.' In his view,
no one system of analytical hypothesis can be 'absolutely'
correct. When we translate words of some language, we imply
the acceptance of a system of analytical hypotheses -- but
we really 'segment' the language into words of our own
language -- strongly implying a narrow, individuated view-
point.
Such individual viewpoints infer countless systems of
hypotheses, at least in principle. Though we have adopted
one system as a result of some accepted tradition, its
individual viewpoint can be seen as not any truer than its
alternative accepted traditions. Therefore, once we have
adopted a system of analytical hypotheses, we like to con-
sider it objectively correct to translate Jacques 'll peut'
by our 'It is raining' -- but the correctness of this
translation is fundamentally relative: it is correct, not
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absolutely, but relatively to one particular or individuated
viewpoint. However, there are others (if not infinite 'other
worlds') at least in principle.
Aune differentiates Quine's relative indeterminancy
with referential indeterminancy -- which further demon-
strates the futility of any absolute' correctness of any
one system of analytical hypothesis. For example, when we
regard certain 'inner states' as thoughts that such and
such, we are giving them a semantic interpretation that,
if Quine is right, must be considered 'relative' rather
than 'absolute.' e.g., to say that willing to do A is an
act of thought having the form 'I will (here and now) do
A' is merely to say that it is a mental semantic counterpart
to some expression of intention (some verbal expression)
having that form. If Quine is right, a verbal expression,
or statement, can be said to have a certain logical form
only in a relative sense.
In a referential sense, any reasonable conception of
volition that a person will to do something A here and
now must have some idea of what he aims to do -- the idea,
specifically, of doing A here and now. This idea has for
him the same reference as the words 'my doing A here and
now.' e.g., when a chess player is said to think 'if he
attacks with his queen, I will castle,' we find that his
thought has a conditional intention.
One does not even have to be able to visualize the
opponent's queen or have the word 'queen' in one's active
vocabulary. All that is necessary if one has the thought
in question, is that something going on in one's head
should be describable as having a certain semantic
character -- a certain reference .
Quine further expresses how translation is 'indeterminate
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by reference to his 'the transivity of conditioning.'
When someone has the premiss 'I will do A in circum-
stances C' and 'I am now in C' firmly in mind will tend
to conclude So I will do A now' -- and this conclusion
will naturally result in appropriate behavior. But there
sre condition s involved. As often happens, a person
trained to reason will tend to skip elements in the
thought process. This explains why so much of our reason-
ing in everyday life is enthymematic
,
or understood but
not stated. Our movements, because of conditions involved,
may become altered between the available premisses to
the conclusion; which is another example of how trans-
lation is indeterminate through Quine's 'the transivity
of conditioning' -- or as Aune states, "how individual
thoughts and statements become elliptical .
Of most significance about 'Quine's indeterminancy,'
is Aune's reference to its necessity for learning more
than is known at present about the way our brains work
and how linguistic behavior is related to neural
. _
. 72functioning
.
THE IMPLIED NONLINEAR 'CONSCIOUSNESS'
To Aune, a person's operative reasons for doing some-
thing A were derived or formed. Aune says 'operative
reasons' here of a person may have premisses (beliefs
or intentions) that would have been a good basis for
his intention to act but that they may not have entered
the reasoning process of that intention. Consequently, a
rationalization is not a genuine explanation of behavior.
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It provides a rationale for the behavior but not the
correct rationale. Too many conditional factors keep
7 3 ^
reason from being simple or linear.
HENCE, ALMOST EVERY BEHAVIOR IS SUI GENERIS
WITHOUT CAUSAL EXPLANATION
I agree that 'purposive behavior' is apt to be
novel; a given instance of it may never have been ob-
served before and may never be observed again. 'Purposive
behavior' cannot have causal explanations (as pre-
viously demonstrated, it is nonlinear and causa sui .)
Even a 'simple action' is actually Sui Generis
,
and thereby considered acausal,' e.g. the breaking of
windows by a thrown rock is a familiar occasion, and
we have sufficient reasons of how such effects happen,
but its related laws or hidden conscious and uncon-
scious motivations (other worlds) are not understood --
hence almost every supposed 'cause' is so novel as to
contain no definite sequence; consequently, for all
practical purposes it is also acausal.
CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER V;
THE 'OTHER WORLDS' OF PHILOSOPHY
All the previously mentioned contemporary phil-
osophers agree that epistemology suffers from a critical
need to 'bridge the gap between the notion of truth and
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the theory of meaning. A reluctant admission, however,
and of greater dimension, is the epistemic gap between
the physical and social sciences. The physical sciences,
through opposing 'fields' of quantum and relativity have
resolved their 'differences' and have continued to pro-
gress by accepting and combining their 'many worlds' into
a physical epistemology -- and utilizing probable, prag-
matic models for empirical adequacy.
However, philosophical epistemology still clings to
archaic 'either-or' linear conceptions -- in a Cartesian
sense. The contemporary philosophers mentioned are (as
usual) the 'annointed few' with the courage to think in
more than one dimension, and to agree that (finally)
philosophy should allie with the other disciplines for
a more 'empirically adequate' overview of truth/meaning.
Where our ' avante-garde
'
philosophers fell short
(as demonstrated in this thesis) is their lack of com-
plexity -- of not combining all major contemporary con-
tributions into a workable overview -- like the physical
scientists have exemplified.
Hilary Putnam does make several contributions such
as his simple (but unworkable) 'correspondence theory;'
which states that 'snow is white' is true if and only if
snow is white is just a tautology. This tautology tells
us nothing about how 'snow is white' is used (in this
world) or understood, and nothing about its asser tability
,
etc. The formal logic of the concept is not all there is
to the notion of truth, that a correspondence account is
needed to understand how language works and how science
works
.
But like shown in the previous essays of the physical
and social sciences, there are 'other worlds of too
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complexed a nature, i£. nonlinear and acausal, to invali-
date any simplistic correspondence.
Putnam practically lists most of the nonlinear
attributes necessary to match the advanced physical
sciences on an equal epistemology -- but then reverts to
an accustomed linear viewpoint. He describes the nonlinear
similarities between the brain and the computer, and admits
of an inner source of prior probability by ver s tehn
,
but
then he later denies an inner world of consciousness.
Putnam's pluralism strongly admits of nonlinear complexities
with 'other worlds,' but refuses to coordinate them and
instead, he points to linear, 'alternate epistemologies'
as a solution.
Bas C. Van Fraasen strongly includes the 'other
worlds' with their attributes, but presents its problems
within a linear, traditional epistemology. Fraasen submits
important epistemic advances, such as a cons true tive
empiricism to update scientific method, and an empirical
adequacy for pragmatic quantitative concepts.
Michael Dummett presents most of the attributes of
the various 'realisms' and admirably presents their pros
and cons. His most creative 'artistic showpiece' is his
article, "Can An Effect Precede Its Cause?" where Dummett
presents a valid case (as in physics and astronomy) that
time is a fexible 'illusion' within relations -- but most
unfortunately, the 'critic' within him overtakes his
creative judgment and he regresses to where he started.
Bruce Aune maintains the necessary creative impetus
toward a new epistemology. Through "Prichard's Theory
of Voluntary Activity," Aune maintains the viewpoint that
the mental process involves nonlinear complex events,
which places 'action' as a causa sui event.
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Along with Quine's 'Indeterminancy,' the learning
process is presented with a necessity for relating its
translations and references to other nonlinear events,
such as neural functioning and the 'other worlds' of
different individual viewpoints -- hinting at a similar
solution as Niels Bohr's 'complementarity.'
Hence, by combining the contributions of Fraasen,
Putnam, Dummett and Aune -- a credible new epistemology
can restore philosophy to its original "philsopher-
king" status -- over all the arts and sciences. An
'empirically adequate' epistemology by the probabilites
of pragmatic modals should be our first goal. Hopefully,
this thesis at least presents the urgency of disgarding
our Car tes ian- like linear thinking for a more unified
(though complexed) nonlinear overview.
RESOLUTION
def
.
the act of analyzing a complex
notion into simpler ones.
Now that sufficient epistemological problems have
been presented, a critical question arizes as to what
scientific method can we present for a consistent theory
of meaning?
Van Fraasen, Putnam, Dummett and Aune have strongly
stated, if not implied, that some form of a unified,
nonlinear overview is needed -- as in the physical
sciences. Then why not 'adapt' a similar physical epis-
temology to bridge this 'gap' between the notion of truth
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and the theory of meaning?
I suggest a method similar to Niels Bohr's
'Complementarity' -- a resolution derived from contra
dictory or exclusive viewpoints.
Stephen Hawking had developed two very important and
apparently contradictory ways of looking at black holes/
white holes. In the 'world' of relativity or gravity
theory, matter expands; in the Vorld' of quantum theory,
matter contracts. According to Hawking, "they were the same
thing, in fact, in different regimes." His public state-
ment did not supply his 'resolution of complementarity'
as to how they are "the same thing" -- but some epistemic
complementarity is evident, if not suggested -- by the
quotation: that both were needed to provide a comprehen-
sive account.
CHAPTER VI
INTRODUCING THE
'BOHREAN COMPLEMENT"
-- or Resolution Of Complementarity
In honor of Niels Bohr's Unitive Principle Of
Complementarity
,
I would like to introduce the term,
"Bohrean Complement" -- to mean: "The Resolution of
Complementarity .
"
This Bohrean Complement gives us the 'missing link'
for combining our Truth/Meaning Complexes into a non-
linear resolution.
However, there are two major difficulties:
1. Truths are constants , but meanings are semantic
variables
,
i.e. they are nonlinear and changeable.
2. Any 'solution' or Bohrean Complement cannot be
thought of in the usual terminology of 'solution', i.e.
in terms of overall 'conclusions' -- in a linear constant
sense
.
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Then, what is a nonlinear resolution?
(which is a Bohrean Complement )
ANSWER: Changeable points of view.
Similar to Niels Bohr measuring electrons as part-
icles o£ as waves, and Hawking measuring Black Holes from
a Quantum viewpoint or a Relativity viewpoint -- in both
cases we are dealing with changeable points of view of
complex entities -- that are not necessarily sequential!
Logicians can formulate abstract complementary re-
lations between abs tract constants and abs trac t variables
within set theory or Quantum Logic -- which are derived
from a necessary sequential order or system. But, logic
has yet to confirm conclusions, not only from set abstract
constants
,
but from concrete complementary semantic
variables -- which have been (to date) too changeable to
convert to abstract instances for measurement.
The nearest that epistemology has compensated for
any form of changeable, semantic variables, is with the
Bayesian schema: where a piece of new evidence confirms
a hypothesis when the posterior probability of the
hypothesis is greater than its prior probability; that
is, if the conditiona l probability of the hypothesis on
the evidence is greater that the probability of the
hypothesis.
But the conditions (of the prior probabilities
mentioned) are sequential . Semantic variables can be
(and usually are) derived from nonsequential complements,
i.e., derived from conscious 'constant variables' and
irrational 'changeable variables' -- usually in
opposition to each other.
Hence, how do you measure such nonsequential,
changeable variables that are not constant?
Changeable Bohrean Complements offer a potential
resolution but would require the unthinkable (?)
cooperation between epis temologists and logicians for
solution.
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